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Creating Arctic Carbon Lock-In
I. Introduction
On 15 January 2011, British Petroleum (BP), the
British oil supermajor, and Rosneft, the Russian oil
champion, announced a stock swap deal to jointly
develop 125,000 km2 in the South Kara Sea.1 As
part of the deal, BP agreed to exchange 5 % of its
stock for 9.5 % of Rosneft’s shares.2 However, BP
was not the only major oil corporation interested in
developing Russia’s oil reserves. According to Ros-
neft’s president, foreign oil executives were “lining
up outside his office.”3 Thus, no one was surprised
when, after the BP-Rosneft deal fell through in May
2011, ExxonMobil replaced BP as Rosneft’s partner
in just three months.4
The BP-Rosneft deal exposed – yet again – the
long-standing conflict between climate change and
fossil fuel production.5 Despite nearly universal
recognition6 of the climate change problem and its
causal link to fossil fuel combustion, energy-related
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and fossil fuel
production continue to grow.7 From 1990 to 2005,
global GHG emissions increased by 26 %.8 Carbon
dioxide emissions grew by 31 % during the same
period.9 Yet, energy security10 and pollution con-
cerns11 dominated the news coverage of the deal,
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1 Stephen Foley, “Russian State Oil Giant Takes $7.8 bn Stake in
BP”, The Independent, 15 January 2011, available on the Internet
at <http://www.independent.co.U.K./news/business/news/russian-
state-oil-giant-takes-78bn-stake-in-bp-2185228.html>(last accessed
on 17 January 2012).
2 Ibid. 
3 Andrew Kramer and Clifford Krauss, “Russia Embraces Offshore
Arctic Drilling”, New York Times, 15 February 2011, available on
the Internet at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/business/
global/16arctic.html?_r=1&pagewanted=1&hp>(last accessed on
17 January 2012).
4 “UPDATE 1-Exxon sees Russia Arctic Tax Terms ‘in Short Order’”,
Reuters Africa, 16 September 2011, available on the Internet at
<http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL5E7KG2P7
20110916?sp=true>(last accessed on 17 January 2012).
5 Roman Sidortsov, “Measuring Our Investment in the Carbon
Status Quo: Case Study of New Oil Production Development in
the Russian Arctic” (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author), at 11–13.
6 Decision 1/CP.17, Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group
on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, preamble, UN
Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, 15 March 2012.




10 Sidortsov, “Measuring Our Investment in the Carbon Status
Quo”, supra, note 5, at 7.
11 Ibid.
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The overarching goal of this paper is to highlight the importance of considering the
climate change implications of oil development in the Arctic. The current global climate
change regime lacks universal emissions controls, thereby creating an opportunity
for “carbon leakage.” Fossil fuels, no matter where extracted, find their way to countries
that are not subject to mandatory emissions reductions. The recent rush to explore vast
hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic may significantly contribute to the existing carbon
lock-in. To illustrate the dangers of the Arctic carbon lock-in, this paper explores the
development of new oil production capacity in the South Kara Sea in Russia.
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not the climate change consequences of the pro-
posed Arctic oil and gas development. Few voices
raised the climate theme, the very core of the issue.
For example, Arild Skedsmo, head of World
Wildlife Foundation Norway’s Climate and Energy
Programme, summarized his concerns in the fol-
lowing statement: “To avoid the worst conse-
quences of climate change, we must phase out vir-
tually all use of fossil fuel by 2050. This leaves very
little room for any large-scale exploration and
extraction of oil and gas in the Arctic.”12
Despite the fact that BP and Rosneft did not close
the deal, the following features of the failed partner-
ship make it an ideal case study for exploring the
conflict between energy and climate change poli-
cies. First, vast and largely undeveloped Arctic oil
and gas resources make that region the world’s last
energy frontier. According to a U.S. Geological Sur-
vey (USGS) study, the Arctic holds 412,157.09 mil-
lion barrels of oil equivalent (boe).13 This amounts
to 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil, 30 % of its
undiscovered natural gas, and 20 % of its undiscov-
ered natural gas liquids.14 Second, the announce-
ment of the BP-Rosneft deal signified, according to
many, the beginning of a large-scale exploration of
the last energy frontier.15 Third, oil is the lifeblood
of today’s economy; petroleum accounts for 32.8 %
of energy consumption in the world.16 Fourth, com-
bustion of oil produces 37 % of the world’s energy-
related emissions.17 Fifth, exploration and extrac-
tion activities in the Arctic will require significant
financial investments and massive development of
supporting infrastructure. The proposed activities
would have led to significant development on- and
offshore with considerable climate change implica-
tions. Sixth, the BP-Rosneft deal was going to be
implemented by a somewhat unique partnership.
There is no doubt the three main players in the
failed deal (i.e., BP and the U.K. and Russian gov-
ernments) were pursuing the same economic inter-
ests in the proposed quest for Russian Arctic oil.18
However, differences in British and Russian climate
change policies could have led to a serious internal
conflict in British society.
After ExxonMobil replaced BP as Rosneft’s
partner in August 2011, BP became the subject
of harsh criticism in the media.19 “Blow for BP” and
“Black Eye for BP” were among the headlines
describing BP’s failure to tap into Russian Arctic oil
resources.20 This article challenges the media’s
rather one-sided assessment, and suggests that BP’s
shareholders may be better off not joining the eco-
nomically and environmentally questionable Arctic
expedition.
The overarching goal of this article is to empha-
size the dangers of investing in oil development in
the Arctic without fully considering the climate
change implications of such development. The first
section explores the shortcomings of the existing
climate regimes in providing an effective solution
to the climate change problem. The second section
explains the carbon lock-in that oil development in
the Russian Arctic will likely create. The third sec-
tion uses the failed BP-Rosneft deal to provide an
example of the duration and strength of a potential
Arctic oil carbon lock-in. 
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12 Terry Macalister, “Exhausted Global Oil Supplies Make Arctic
the New Hydrocarbon Frontier”, The Guardian, 5 July 2011,
available on the Internet at <http://www.guardian.co.U.K./
environment/2011/jul/05/oil-supplies-arctic>(last accessed on
17 January 2012).
13 U.S. Geological Survey, “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal:
Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic
Circle” (2008), at 4.
14 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Arctic Oil and Natural
Gas Potential” (2009), at 6. 
15 Foley, “Russian State Oil Giant Takes $7.8 bn Stake in BP”, supra,
note 1. The South Kara Sea exploration is not the first attempt
to explore hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic. For example,
Statoil and Eni are currently developing the Goliat oil field in the
Barents Sea. U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Countries:
Norway”, available on the Internet at <http://www.eia.gov/
countries/cab.cfm?fips=NO> (last accessed on 17 January 
2012).
16 International Energy Agency, “CO2 Emissions From Fuel Combus-
tion, Highlights” (Paris: IEA, 2011), at 6.
17 International Energy Agency, “2011 Key World Energy Statistics”
(Paris: IEA, 2011), at 8.
18 Despite the fact that BP is a private company, it is closely tied
with the U.K. government and British society. BP provides
employment for thousands of Britons and contributes billions
in tax revenue. See infra, pp. 10–11.
19 Jonathan Sibun, “Blow for BP as Rosneft, Exxon Mobil Sign Arc-
tic Oil Deal”, The Telegraph, 30 August 2011, available on the
Internet at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/
energy/oilandgas/8731228/Blow-for-BP-as-Rosneft-Exxon-Mobil-
sign-Arctic-oil-deal.html>(last accessed on 17 January 2012); 
Guy Chazan, “Exxon’s Arctic Deal Is Black Eye for BP”, Wall
Street Journal, 31 August 2011, available on the Internet at
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405311190335270457
6540702267428180.html>(last accessed on 17 January 2012).
20 Ibid.
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II. Why the Global Mitigation Effort Is
Failing: Flaws in the Current Climate
Regime
Theoretically, mandatory reduction of CO2 emis-
sions will lead to a reduced demand for fossil fuels,
which in turn will lead to a reduction in supply.
Thus, if the ultimate goal is to reduce demand, there
is no need to bother with reducing supply. However,
this will only be true if control of the demand is
truly universal. Otherwise, fossil fuels, no matter
where extracted, will find their way to a country
where they can be “converted” into CO2 without any
constraint imposed by international or domestic
law. Mechanisms that focus on controlling supply
of fossil fuels at the point of production could at a
minimum reduce such “carbon leakage.” Current
legal and regulatory mechanisms do not provide
universal control of carbon emissions. Nor does the
global climate regime regulate fossil fuel produc-
tion to compensate for the lack of universal emis-
sions controls.
The U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) divides all participating coun-
tries into two camps: Annex I and non-Annex I.21
Annex I Parties include industrialized nations that
were members of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) when the
UNFCCC was signed in 1992 and former Soviet bloc
states, represented by former Soviet republics and
several Central and Eastern European nations.22
Non-Annex I Parties are mostly developing nations,
including forty-nine countries that are designated
as least-developed countries (LDCs).23 The UNFCCC
places a greater burden on Annex I Parties to miti-
gate the effects of climate change.24
The Kyoto Protocol sets forth a far more signifi-
cant difference in responsibilities between Annex I
and non-Annex I countries. The Protocol sets bind-
ing GHG emissions reduction targets for thirty-
seven industrialized nations and the European
Community.25 Pursuant to the provisions of the
Protocol, Annex I countries are the only parties
responsible for reducing their national emissions.26
Emissions trading, the Clean Development Mecha-
nism (CDM), and Joint Implementation (JI) provide
means for an Annex I country to achieve its target
in cooperation with other countries.27 Paradoxically,
a reverse rule does not apply when an Annex I
country finances, facilitates, and/or otherwise coop-
erates with a third country on a project that
increases carbon emissions. 
Although emissions reduction goals do not apply
universally under the current international climate
regime, recent negotiations of the UNFCCC Confer-
ence of Parties (COP) in Copenhagen (COP15), Can-
cun (COP16), and Durban (COP17) indicate that the
status quo may not last forever. With a provision
recognizing that the increase in global temperature
should not exceed 2°C, the Copenhagen Accord
appears to be a step toward universal obligations to
cut carbon emissions.28 However, the Accord gener-
ally continues the theme set forth in the Kyoto Pro-
tocol by imposing uneven emissions reduction
responsibilities on Annex I and non-Annex I coun-
tries.29 Under Article 4, Annex I countries agree “to
implement individually or jointly the quantified
economy-wide emissions targets for 2020.”30 In con-
trast, non-Annex I countries agree to take mitiga-
tion actions, provided they receive financial and
technical support from Annex I countries.31 Even if
the Copenhagen Accord were to require carbon
emission reductions from both groups of countries,
it remains a political and non-binding agreement.
The Cancun Agreements elaborate on many of
the Copenhagen Accord’s provisions. For example,
the Agreements confirm the 2 °C goal and even
entertain the possibility of a 1.5 °C maximum in-
crease over the pre-industrial global temperature.32
Regarding non-Annex I countries, the Cancun
21 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
“Parties & Observers”, available on the Internet at
<http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php> (last





26 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, Kyoto, 10 December 1997, in force 16 Feb-
ruary 2005, 37 International Legal Materials (1998), Annex B.
27 Ibid., Arts. 6, 12, 17.
28 Decision 2/CP.15, Copenhagen Accord, UN Doc.
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, 30 March 2010, para. 1.
29 Ibid., Arts. 4, 5.
30 Ibid., Art. 4. 
31 Ibid., Art. 5.
32 Decision 1/CP.16, The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the
Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative
Action under the Convention, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1,
15 March 2011, para. 4.
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Agreements essentially restate the emission reduc-
tion provisions from the Copenhagen Accord.33
Although more than 190 nations at the UNFCCC
negotiations in Durban agreed to begin the process
toward creating a new agreement that treats all
nations equally, achieving such binding commit-
ments will not be an easy task given the record of
previous climate talks.34 The debate on how to allo-
cate GHG emissions reductions among Annex I and
non-Annex I countries has often taken center stage
in international negotiations. For example, China is
the world’s largest GHG emitter but refuses to take
on binding commitments on equitable grounds.35
In particular, in Copenhagen China argued first,
that it did not cause the problem; second, that
it lacks the capacity to deal with the problem with-
out help from Annex I countries; and third, that
the right to development trumps any concern for
climate change.36 Under this reasoning, the burden
to mitigate the effects of climate change should
continue to rest heavily on developed countries.37
Further, developing nations should be required to
participate in mitigation only with financial and
technical assistance from developed countries.38
Although China is just one among many non-
Annex I countries, several factors make its behavior
a valid reason for concern. As noted above, China is
the world’s fastest growing economy and largest
GHG emitter.39 Additionally, the position of the Chi-
nese government taken in Copenhagen as high-
lighted above leaves little doubt about the country’s
intentions.40 Finally, as noted above, China is not
alone in its opposition to binding and verifiable
emission reduction goals. For example, India, the
third largest GHG emitter and another rapidly
developing economy, often sides with China on this
issue. Thus, barring a drastic turnaround in China’s
position, nations will likely face an uphill battle
negotiating a new agreement based on common
and shared responsibilities. 
Many countries have enacted laws and promul-
gated regulations to implement their obligations
under the Kyoto Protocol. The United Kingdom, like
some other nations, went beyond its Kyoto goals
and adopted more aggressive climate legislation.41
The Russian Federation, on the other hand, largely
has not.42 Although the British and Russian climate
regimes may be far apart in terms of their commit-
ments to reducing domestic carbon emissions, they
represent the global norm in terms of methodol-
ogy.43 Both follow the Kyoto approach and do little
to address the out-of-state emissions that domestic
companies help to generate by financing, operating,
or hosting fossil fuel production.44 Additionally,
neither regime accounts for emissions “stored” in
the fossil fuels that domestic companies produce.45
Based on the flaws of the current global climate
regime identified above, one could reasonably
conclude that this structure cannot serve as a foun-
dation for achieving meaningful carbon reductions.
First, emissions reduction goals do not apply uni-
versally, thereby creating a real possibility of
“carbon leakage.” Second, the regime does not
regulate supply (production) of fossil fuels, includ-
ing oil, to compensate for inadequate emission
controls. Third, the regime does not take into
account the economic interests that some Annex I
nations (directly through export credit agencies or
indirectly through national companies) have in
investing in fossil fuel production. As a result, a
state can, on paper, be fully committed to signifi-
cant domestic reductions while providing financial
and technical help to explore and extract oil and
other fossil fuels that would be converted into GHG
emissions in another country. Fourth, the regime
does not account for economically and politically
Creating Arctic Carbon Lock-In6
33 Ibid., paras. 9–12.
34 Decision 1/CP.17, supra, note 6, paras. 2–4.
35 Jing Cao, “Reconciling Human Development and Climate Pro-
tection: A Multistage Hybrid Climate Policy Architecture”, in
Joseph Aldy and Robert Stavins (eds), Post-Kyoto International
Climate Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)
563, at 570.
36 People’s Republic of China, National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC), “Implementation of the Bali Roadmap:
China’s Position on the Copenhagen Climate Change
Conference”, 20 May 2009, available on the Internet at
<http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/t20090521_280382.htm>
(last accessed on 17 January 2012).
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid.
39 CO2 Emissions, supra, note 16, at 9.
40 China’s Position, supra, note 37. 
41 Sidortsov, “Measuring Our Investment in the Carbon Status
Quo”, supra, note 5, at 26–28.
42 Ibid., at 28–31.
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influential non-government actors whose commer-
cial existence depends on fossil fuel production. 
The fact that over 190 nations agreed in Durban
to negotiate a new global climate agreement does
not guarantee that an agreement will actually be
reached. As recent history clearly shows, climate
negotiations are a fragile process where things can
go wrong at any given moment. China could stick to
its past position or, if elected, a republican U.S. pres-
ident may refuse to sign a new agreement.46 Addi-
tionally, the nine years leading to the new agree-
ment’s entry into force gives politicians enough
time to adopt national policies that would make rat-
ification or meaningful implementation of the new
agreement difficult.47 A real possibility exists for
some nations to treat these nine years as their last
carbon feast before a long famine. Notwithstanding
the potential pitfalls, the possibility of a global cli-
mate agreement imposing universal climate con-
trols has increased drastically after Durban. After
all, this is the first time the parties agreed to do so.48
III. Creating Arctic Oil Carbon Lock-In,
Path Dependence, Stickiness, and
Inertia
The decision to invest in developing Russian Arctic
oil resources now will shape a wide range of deci-
sions in the future. Failure to consider conse-
quences of such a major undertaking will create a
strong incentive to keep developing oil resources
until the investment is recouped while ignoring the
climate problem, even when it becomes much more
acute. 
Continuing to operate under conditions that are no
longer valid is a phenomenon known as “path
dependence.” The gist of this concept is that initial
conditions influence outcomes.49 “Stickiness” and
“inertia”, other terms frequently used to describe
path dependence, often lead to positive feedback
loops within the system.50 Path dependence
becomes a self-perpetuating process, and the whole
system becomes resistant to change.51 As a result,
“[s]ocieties that get ‘stuck’ embody belief systems
and institutions that fail to confront and solve new
problems of societal complexity.”52
Path dependence is prevalent in the energy
sector53 perpetuated by large-scale investments in
energy infrastructure.54 The fossil fuel component
of energy systems has prompted some authors to
use the term “carbon lock-in” in relation to energy
path dependence.55 This term is often used to
describe the barriers to transitioning to a low-
carbon economy when society remains stuck in a
carbon rut.56 Such studies are frequently focused
on the decisions that were made before climate
change became a prominent public policy topic.57
The discussion revolves around untangling the
myriad vested interests and overcoming the legacy
of the decisions made in the past.58 Because oil
development in the Russian Arctic continental shelf
at large has not started, we are witnessing a situa-
tion in which decisions are made presently. Today,
a broad range of analysts and policymakers, in-
cluding the world’s leading energy experts, recog-
nize that climate change implications should factor
into decisions regarding building the world’s
energy future.59 After all, according to the Inter-
national Energy Agency, the efforts of keeping
46 Nearly all 2012 republican front-runners for U.S. president deny
or downplay the problem of climate change. Timothy Hurst,
“Republican Presidential Candidates on Climate Change”, 22
August 2011, available on the Internet at
<http://ecopolitology.org/2011/08/22/republican-presidential-
candidates-on-climate-change>(last accessed on 17 January
2012). 
47 The new agreement is scheduled to be signed by 2015 and enter
into force by 2020. Decision 1/CP.17, supra, note 6, para. 4.
48 Ibid., at preamble.
49 Andreas Goldthau and Benjamin Sovacool, “The Uniqueness
of the Energy Security, Justice, and Governance Problem”,
41 Energy Policy (2012), 232, at 234.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Douglas C. North, Prize Lecture, Economic Performance 
Through Time, 9 December 1993, available on the Internet at
<http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/
1993/north-lecture.html>(last accessed on 17 January 2012).
53 Goldthau and Sovacool, “The Uniqueness of the Energy
Security, Justice, and Governance Problem”, supra, note 49,
at 234.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid. Because the term “carbon lock-in” refers specifically to
the fossil fuel legacy of the energy sector, I use this term for
the remainder of this article.
56 Marilyn A. Brown et al., “Carbon Lock-In: Barriers to Deploying
Climate Change Mitigation Technologies” (Oak Ridge, Tenn.:
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 2008).
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2010 (Paris:
IEA, 2010), at 46.
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Earth’s temperature under 2 °C should drive oil
demand down.60
However, projected increases in oil demand,
rather than climate change-related constraints on
oil production, appears to be the dominant assump-
tion upon which BP, Exxon Mobil, and Shell base
their decisions to explore the Arctic.61 The general
consensus among the oil supermajors regarding the
increase in global oil demand during the next 20
years corresponds to the goal and expectation of the
Russian Federation to satisfy the demand. The
Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation sets
“meeting the global demand for oil and petroleum
products” as a strategic goal for the development of
the Russian oil industry.62
Forecasts of an increased demand for oil coupled
with plans to meet that demand provide a danger-
ous basis for the decision to invest in oil exploration
and extraction in the Arctic. The basis for this deci-
sion appears to be omitting an important factor –
climate change-related constrains on oil production.
Failure to incorporate this already visible and pres-
ent condition will not only create a financial rut –
Arctic oil carbon lock-in – it will also set the course
for a painful collision between the chosen path and
a condition that will become too dangerous to
ignore.
IV. Sizing Up the Arctic Oil Carbon
Lock-In
1. The Duration of the Arctic Oil Carbon Lock-In
Securing oil for today and tomorrow does not mean
that the valve can be shut off the day after tomor-
row without serious socio-economic consequences.
Investing in exploratory drilling usually has much
higher sunk costs than simply investing in seismic
studies. Additionally, developing a small field that
is part of a large, already-developed area (e.g. the
North Sea) will have a different carbon lock-in
effect than in a virtually unknown region (i.e. the
South Kara Sea). In the latter case, most of the sup-
porting infrastructure and exploration and extrac-
tion logistics will have to be created from scratch,
requiring a greater investment. Finally, the duration
of exploration and extraction can also play a large
role in the duration and strength of the carbon lock-
in. In sum, the degree and term of carbon lock-in
depends on 1) total sunk costs of the undertaking;
2) how far along in the process parties are; 3) esti-
mated resources; 4) the horizontal scope of the
undertaking; and, 5) the economic, political, and
technical restraints on the term of the undertaking. 
Arctic oil will be expensive to find, lift, and
deliver. The sunk costs of South Kara Sea oil devel-
opment could be as high as $500 billion.63 Pursuant
to the U.S. Energy Information Administration,
“[f]inding large Arctic oil and natural gas deposits is
difficult and expensive; developing them as com-
mercially profitable ventures is even more challeng-
ing.”64 Additionally, oil and gas exploration and
extraction in the Arctic require deploying cutting
edge technology, which comes at a high cost.65
Technical, environmental, and logistical difficulties
also lead to higher capital costs.66 All these factors
may push the price of Arctic oil to over $100 per
barrel.67 If the South Kara Sea project proceeds as
intended, the total cost of South Kara Sea oil devel-
opment may exceed the initial $3.2 billion more
than a hundred times.68
Had it succeeded, the BP-Rosneft joint venture
would have started its activities in the very begin-
ning of the exploration process. Three license blocs
in the South Kara Sea – EPNA 1, 2, and 3 – have
Creating Arctic Carbon Lock-In8
60 Ibid., at 444. 
61 British Petroleum, “Energy Outlook 2030” (London: BP, 2012), at
29; ExxonMobil, “The Outlook for Energy: A View to 2030” (Irv-
ing, Tx: 2009), at 40; Shell International BV, “Shell Energy Sce-
narios to 2050” (The Hague: Shell International, 2008), at 17, 3. 
62 Energeticheskaya Strategiya Rossii na Period do 2030 Goda [The
Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period Ending in 2030], 13
November 2009, at 42. 
63 Yuriy Humber and Stephen Bierman, “Exxon Confident of Right
to Book Russian Arctic Oil Reserves”, Bloomberg, 27 September
2011, available on the Internet at <http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2011-09-27/exxon-confident-it-can-book-oil-reserves-in-
russian-arctic.html>(last accessed on 17 January 2012).
64 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Arctic Oil and Natural
Gas Potential”, supra, note 14, at 6.
65 David Cohen, “Arctic Dreams”, Energy Bulletin, 25 April 
2007, available on the Internet at <http://www.energy
bulletin.net/node/29151>(last accessed on 17 January 
2012).
66 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Arctic Oil 
and Natural Gas Potential”, supra, note 14, at 6.
67 Christoph Seidler, “The Exorbitant Dream of Arctic Oil”,
Spiegel, 26 January 2011, available on the Internet at
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/busi-
ness/0,1518,741820,00.html>(last accessed on 17 January 
2012).
68 It is important to note that ExxonMobil pledged $3.2 billion
for both the South Kara Sea and Black Sea exploration
projects. Humber and Bierman, “Exxon Confident of Right to
Book Russian Arctic Oil Reserves”, supra, note 63.
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largely not been studied. In fact, the type of license
that Rosneft claims to possess was issued by Rosne-
dra, the Russian oil exploration and licensing
agency, for that exact purpose.69
The estimated size of the South Kara Sea
resources could make this undertaking one of the
largest offshore developments in the world. If the
estimate is any indication of potential proven
reserves, it is easy to understand why BP made an
aggressive play for EPNA 1, 2, and 3. According
to Rosneft, the field’s resources are estimated at
16 billion tons of oil equivalent (toe) (114.36 billion
boe),70 with up to 5 billion tons of oil (35.74 billion
barrels).71 Even if the actual resources are only one-
tenth of the estimate, the South Kara Sea reserves
will dwarf the two largest Norwegian Arctic fields,
Skrugart and Goliat, combined, by a factor of
seven.72
The horizontal scope of the undertaking prom-
ises to be massive. 73 The northern territories of the
country adjacent to the prospective oil fields remain
largely undeveloped.74 Because none of the discov-
ered Arctic offshore oil and gas fields has started
producing, the infrastructure to support offshore oil
and gas virtually does not exist.75 Thus, develop-
ment of Russian offshore oil fields will require a
significant investment in a number of areas, rang-
ing from sea ports to helicopter pads.
Based on comparisons with compatible oil devel-
opment projects in the Russian Arctic and the
North Sea, the South Kara Sea development could
go on for at least twenty-five to forty years. The Pri-
razlomnoe oil field was discovered in the Pechora
Sea in 1989, 76 and is scheduled to start commercial
production in 2011.77 The fact that it has taken the
operators twenty-two years to start extraction can
be attributed to the break-up of the Soviet Union
and the ensuing economic turmoil in Russia.78
Additionally, the current operator is employing
rather sophisticated technology that took several
years to develop and implement, which further
stalled extraction. The ice-resistant Prirazlomnaya
platform is expected to extract oil from the 610 mil-
lion barrel field for about twenty-two years.79 This
term is in line with the average twenty- to thirty-
year production term for most U.K. and Norwegian
North Sea fields that went into production in the
1970s and 1980s.80
Even a cursory analysis of the identified five fac-
tors suggests that every step toward developing
Russian Arctic resources will produce significant
sunk costs and create carbon lock-in that would
deepen with every additional step for twenty-five to
forty years.
2. The Role of State and Non-State
Actors in Strengthening the Arctic
Carbon Lock-In
When BP and Rosneft agreed to join forces in Janu-
ary 2011, Vladimir Putin called the deal “an alliance
based on mutual advantage.”81 The Russian Prime
Minister underscored the fact that the parties had
common interests in developing the South Kara Sea
that they could only achieve together. The mutual
69 Rosneft, Arkticheskie Morya Rossii [Russian Arctic Seas],
available on the Internet at <http://www.rosneft.ru/Upstream/
Exploration/arctic_seas/>(last accessed on 17 January 2012);
Betsy Baker et al., “Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines in
Greenland and the Russian Federation, Arctic Offshore Oil
and Gas Guidelines” (2011), at 53, available on the Internet
at <http://www.vermontlaw.edu/Documents/IEE/20110215_IEE-
BakerWP5.pdf>(last accessed on 17 January 2012).
70 Russian Arctic Seas, supra, note 69.
71 “Bolshoi Petroleum”, 17 January 2011, available on the Internet
at <http://www.oilru.com/news/227118/>(last accessed on
17 January 2012).
72 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Countries: Norway”,
supra, note 15.
73 “Rossijskij Uchenyj: Perechen Zayavok ‘Gazproma’ i ‘Rosnefti’
na Polucheniya Arkticheskih Litsenziy ne Obespechivaet
Namechennyh Rubezhej Dobychi i Podgotovki Zapasov [Russian
Scientists: The Number of License Applications from Gazprom
and Rosneft Does not Translate into Meeting the Requirements
of the Planned Output]”, Neft Rossii [Russia’s Oil], 25 February
2011, available on the Internet at <http://www.oilru.com/news/
236640/>(last accessed on 17 January 2012).
74 Elena Andreeva and Valery Kryukov, “The Russian Model:
Merging Profit and Sustainability”, in Aslaug Mikkelsen 
and Oluf Langhelle (eds), Arctic Oil and Gas: Sustainability 
at Risk? (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), at 241–42.
75 Russia’s Oil, “Russian Scientists”, supra, note 73.
76 “Prirazlomnoye Oilfield - Russian Federation”, available 
on the Internet at <http://www.offshore-technology.com/
projects/Prirazlomnoye/>(last accessed on 17 January 
2012).
77 “Prirazlomnoe Oil Field”, available on the Internet at
<http://www.gazprom.com/production/projects/
deposits/pnm/>(last accessed on 17 January 2012).
78 Prirazlomnoye Oilfield, supra, note 77. 
79 Ibid.
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N.C.: McFarland & Company, 2005), at 58–59, 64.
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CCLR 1|2012 9
CCLR 1-12  20.06.2012  13:45 Uhr  Seite 9
advantage, the common economic goal, would have
strengthened an alliance that already consisted of
two powerful nations and the fourth largest com-
pany in the world.82 Additionally, the Arctic oil car-
bon lock-in, fortified by the long term systemic
interaction among BP (the non-state actor), the U.K.
(the domicile country), and Russia (the host coun-
try), would have been on a collision course with the
visible willingness of these actors to combat climate
change.83
a. The Non-State Actor (BP)
BP, as any oil company, is in the business of produc-
ing and selling oil and petroleum products. Thus, it
is reasonable to assume that the company’s share-
holders recognize that their dividend depends on
how well the company finds, lifts, transports,
processes, and sells oil and petroleum products to
consumers. Theoretically, company employees
should have the same expectations regarding their
job security. Clearly, this is an oversimplification of
why people choose to invest or work in the petro-
leum industry or for a specific company. Otherwise,
BP would not be spending billions of dollars on its
“Beyond Petroleum” campaign.84 However, no mat-
ter what the motivations are, shareholders and
employees of an oil company want their company
to succeed. And the definition of success does not
include absorbing the sunk cost of a project the
company needs to cancel before the project has paid
for itself. 
To illustrate this point, consider the following
hypothetical. Suppose that the BP-Rosneft deal had
gone through and the international community
kept its promise to adopt a new climate agreement
based on universal emissions controls. This meas-
ure would have rendered South Kara Sea oil less
competitive. BP’s shareholders and employees
would face the dilemma of supporting new climate
change action at the expense of their financial secu-
rity. It is safe to assume that at least some of the
shareholders and employees otherwise concerned
about climate change would choose to avoid finan-
cial loss. Given the fact that support for the climate
measure would result in a certain detriment (e.g.,
financial loss, loss of a job, etc.) while offering an
uncertain benefit (e.g., the measure may not be
enough to stop rapid climate change), the non-sup-
porters group may be big enough to kill the meas-
ure domestically.
Many BP investors and employees faced a similar
dilemma following the BP oil disaster in the
Macondo Prospect. In the summer of 2010, Presi-
dent Obama secured $20 billion from BP to cover
environmental damage caused by the accident
while not closing the door to additional contribu-
tions from the company.85 It is hard to imagine that
BP shareholders and employees wished for the
gigantic oil slick to remain floating in the Gulf of
Mexico. Yet, shareholder pressure triggered by the
company’s suspension of dividend payments due
to the mounting cleanup costs prompted BP to
object to the lack of an environmental liability cap.
The company even enlisted British Prime Minister
David Cameron to publicly lobby on its behalf.86
b. The Domicile Country (U.K.)
Mr. Cameron’s appeal to President Obama high-
lights the interest the British government has in
BP’s economic status. U.K. shareholders own 44 %
of the company.87 Approximately 18 million Britons
own BP’s stock either individually or through a
pension fund.88 London Mayor Boris Johnson
responded to the rapid decline in value of BP’s
stock in 2010, saying “[w]hen you consider the huge
exposure of British pension funds to BP it starts to
become a matter of national concern.”89 According
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to BP, in 2009 every £1 of every £7 paid to a pension
fund by FTSE top 100 companies was in the form of
a dividend paid by BP.90
As of June 2010, the company employed 10,105
people in the U.K.91 Although BP’s domestic
employment many not seem very impressive com-
pared to other countries where it operates (BP
employed more than twice as many people in the
United States in 2010), its tax contributions in the
U.K. are very significant.92 In 2006–2008, BP paid
£1.7 billion ($2.8 billion) in profits tax.93 The total
tax contribution paid by the company and its
employees to the U.K. revenue in 2009 was £5.8 bil-
lion ($9.55 billion).94
Such a tight connection between BP and the U.K.
government may call into question the prospects
for an aggressive British climate change policy. The
government may opt not to risk the loss of tax
revenue and avoid public outcry over lost dividends
if BP is faced with abandoning a project with high
sunk cost. As a result, BP as the non-state actor
and the U.K. as the domicile state would form a
formidable alliance that depends upon maintaining
the carbon status quo.
c. The Host Country (Russia)
Russia is the world’s largest oil and second-largest
natural gas producer.95 Russia is also the world’s
leader in energy exports.96 In fact, its recent eco-
nomic growth is almost exclusively attributable to
oil and gas exports.97 Currently, oil and gas produc-
tion and exports are as indispensable to Russia’s
economy and geo-political aspirations as vodka is to
a Russian festive dinner. Oil and gas are the coun-
try’s primary means of survival and basis for
reclaiming its relevance in the world. As Marshal
Gordon’s book suggests, Russia is a “petrostate.”98
Oil exports have played a significant role in the
Russian economy for over 100 years.99 In the 1960s
and 1970s, the increase in petroleum output fol-
lowed by the increase in exports of oil and petro-
leum products gave the Soviet leadership a power-
ful diplomatic weapon to spread its influence
among newly decolonized countries. Currently,
more than half of Russia’s revenues come from the
oil and gas sector.100 To hedge against oil price
volatility, Russia created the Stabilization Fund,
which gets replenished and drained as oil prices go
up and down.101 In 2007, the Russian government
amassed formidable rainy day financial reserves in
the form of $120 billion in the Stabilization Fund
and $420 billion in the treasury and Central
Bank.102 According to Gordon, oil exports provided
Russia the wherewithal to reach this level of finan-
cial stability.103
Unsurprisingly, Russia was one of the hardest hit
economies in late 2008.104 To slow devaluation of
the ruble and avoid economic collapse, Russia spent
one third of its foreign currency reserves.105 In the
first quarter of 2011, the oil revenue dependence
pattern repeated itself; high oil prices again boosted
Russia’s economic growth.106
Although attempts have been made to introduce
diversity into the Russian economy, none has posed
a serious challenge to Putin’s energy superpower
blueprint.107 For example, Russia’s then-president,
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on fossil fuel exports “humiliating.”108 But even he
had to tone down his modernization rhetoric in
light of the upcoming presidential election battle, as
promises to keep gasoline prices low appear to res-
onate better with Russian voters.109 Embedded in
every phase of the Russian modern reality, reliance
on oil exports is unlikely to change anytime soon.
Russia’s economic and geo-political resurgence
fueled by oil exports came at an environmental
and social price. The United Nations Development
Programme pointed out that “environmental pollu-
tion caused by the energy segment is a serious
health hazard.”110 Overdevelopment of the fuel and
energy sectors resulted in “energy and environmen-
tal malaise.”111 Income inequality remains an acute
problem in Russia, and the newfound oil wealth
did not provide a solution.112 Yet, most importantly
for this study, Russia’s dependence on oil produc-
tion makes it ideologically opposed to a meaningful
climate change action. The impact of the 10.7 mil-
lion barrels of oil a day that it currently produces
overshadows its domestic emissions.113
The main goal of this subchapter is not to criti-
cize Russia’s dependence on oil; it is to contrast
Russia’s real position on climate change with the
U.K.’s. Although these positions are fundamentally
different, the U.K. government and the 18 million
British BP shareholders would have found them-
selves allied with Russia on the climate issue if the
deal had gone through. Such an alliance would have
ensured the longevity of the carbon lock-in in the
Russian Arctic while pitting British economic inter-
ests against its progressive climate policy.
V. Conclusion
The failure of the current climate regime to provide
a universal clamp on the growth of GHG emissions
has prompted governments and non-state actors to
plan for ever-increasing fossil fuel production
capacity. Every step in this direction perpetuates the
carbon lock-in and puts a new shared-responsibili-
ties climate agreement in jeopardy. The South Kara
Sea project is just one example of this tendency. If
the BP-Rosneft deal had succeeded, oil development
in the South Kara Sea would have contributed to
the existing carbon lock-in by adding a tight and
strong dependence sub-system. Climate change is
too dangerous of a problem to ignore both for eco-
nomic and environmental reasons. Therefore, the
new oil explorers of the Arctic should give climate
change effects careful consideration before embark-
ing on the treacherous Arctic oil expedition.
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